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The social security program in this country came into existence as
a result of the most serious depression in our history. There bad
been earlier social security measures—most notably workmen's
compensation. And the full employment and the semicontrolled
economy of the war years have left their impress on the program,
both in the rapid growth of supplementary private plans and in
attitudes toward the basic national system of old age and survivors'
insurance and its place in our economy. The social security pro-
grams areS now generally regarded as a continuing mechanism for
providing income to individuals and groups who—whether in time
of full employment or depression—are for short or long periods
without income from employment.
The existence of such programs, however, cannot but have an
effect on the course of any future depression, recession, or lesser
adjustment in economic activity. As this paper will attempt to
demonstrate, the social security programs should be counted among
the significant built-in stabilizers. But considerably more analysis
is needed of the nature and the strength of the stabilizing effect
which is exerted by existing programs or which might be exerted
by somewhat modified and expanded programs. Such an analysis
must be concerned with (1) the direct compensatory action of un-
employment insurance and, to some extent, of all the social security
pro grams; (2) the steady base of demand provided by the pro-
grams; (S) the effect of methods of financing; and (4) the psycho-
logical, political, and administrative importance of the programs
as going institutions.
In the absence of social security programs, individuals who have
no current income from employment and earnings, and their de-
pendents, draw their support from families or relatives, from
The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily
those of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
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private charity, or from use of personal and assets. The
family or clan system that, largely through a widespread sharing
of income in kind, was the major guarantee of security in earlier
societies has shown itself unable to survive in industrial and highly
organized economies. In our society, support by relatives and
friends is still important in meeting the needs of persons who lack
sufficient independent sources of income, but it has largely a sup-
plementary role. In this respect we are in a transitional stage.
There are, for example, still a considerable number of older per-
Sons who do not qualify for benefits under the old age insurance
program, but this number is rapidly decreasing. At present, about
45 per cent of all persons aged 65 and over are eligible for benefits;
by 1960 about 75 per cent and by 1980 nearly 95 per cent will
be eligible as a result of the maturing of the system and the broad
coverage extensions effected by the 1954 amendments of the Social
Security Act. Unemployment insurance—in spite of limitations of
coverage and of benefit adequacy—has become the primary method
of channeling current income to persons who are temporarily
unemployed. For those who are sick or• disabled, our social se-
curity provisions are much more limited.• Railroad workers and most
government employees—as well as veterans—have disability in-
surance protection. Otherwise, the major organized arrangements
are paid sick leave or private employee benefit plans, which ordi-
narily stop for an individual when he leaves the particular employ-
ment, and public assistance for the permanently and totally disabled.
In assessing the economic effects of the existing or of an expanded
social security system, we are concerned with the amount of the
transfer payments involved in relation to other aggregates, such
as wages and salaries or personal consumption expenditures. We
are concerned with the net effect on consumption and, indirectly,
on productivity of this organized method of providing for the non-
earning groups. And we are concerned with the way in which these
programs adjust automatically to changing economic conditions,
and the kind of stabilizing influence which they thus exert.
1. Unemployment Insurance
Certain easily stated relationships give one kind of quantitative
measure of the possible compensatory action of unemployment
insurance. In 1954 the state and railroad unemployment insurance
programs together covered about two-thirds of all civilian em-
ployees and about 77 per cent of civilian wages and salaries or just
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under 60 per cent of total earnings (including earnings of the
self-employed). Since average weekly benefits for total unemploy-
ment are only about one-third of average weekly wages, under
existing civilian programs the maximum replacement of aggregate
wage loss due to unemployment would be about 25 per cent even
in the initial stage of a downturn if the incidence of unemploy-
ment were proportionately the same in the covered and noncovered
sectors of the This figure must be further reduced to take
account of compensation for partial unemployment at a rate of
less than one-third of the wage loss, and the substantial amount
of uncompensated earnings loss resulting from disqualifications for
benefits, initial waiting periods before benefits are payable, and the
exhaustion of benefit rights before the individual is re-employed.
In most states the initial waiting period after a claim is filed and
before benefits become payable is now one week or less. The ex-
tent of uncompensated wage loss resulting from this factor can be
measured by comparing the figures on average weekly insured
unemployment with the average weekly number of beneficiaries.
In 1949, for instance, almost 13 million weeks of unemployment
were uncompensated because they were waiting-period weeks
under the state, railroad, or veterans' programs (as compared with
115.7 million weeks compensated). Had these weeks been com-
pensated at the average rate, the total unemployment benefits
paid in that year would have been increased by about 11 per cent.
It is more difficult to measure the effect of ineligibility for benefits
resulting either from insufficient wage credits or from disqualifi-
cations. At the outset of an employment decline, those who fail to
meet the wage credit requirements will be primarily marginal
workers and also new entrants to the labor force. The longer a de-
pression continues, the more significant will be this factor of new
entrants who cannot qualify for benefits. The disqualification pro-
visions of most state unemployment insurance laws have become
increasingly restrictive. In almost all states, workers who are fired
for misconduct (a term subject to wide variations of interpretation)
are disqualified for benefits for specified periods or for the duration
of a spell of unemployment. So also are workers who leave a job
without "good cause." This means that workers who leave one job
with the expectation of finding a better one which then does not
'Special provisions for veterans' unemployment benefits may also be a signifi-
cant factor in some periods. This point is discussed below in connection with
the analysis of the 1949-1950 experience. Coverage was extended somewhat by
the 1945 amendments to the Social Security Act (see below).
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materialize, secondary workers who move to another locality when
the primary earner moves, workers who are forced to give up
particular jobs for reasons of health, and many others who are
not voluntarily unemployed in the ordinary meaning of that term,
fail to qualify for benefits. There is no basis for judging whether
the administration of the disqualification provisions is likely to result
in proportionately more uncompensated wage loss in good times,
at the beginning of a depression, or after a depression has continued
for some time.
At the beginning of a decline in economic activity, a large part
of the wage loss may result from partial unemployment—three-
or four-day workweeks, a drop in overtime hours, etc. All the state
unemployment insurance laws and the railroad unemployment
insurance program provide some coverage for partial unemploy-
ment, but most states limit the payment to an amount equal to
the difference between weekly earnings (from a short workweek or
odd jobs) and the maximum weekly benefit amount plus a variable
allowance (in most states, $3). Thus, on the average, workers may
suffer a wage loss of two-thirds of their previous earnings and still
not be entitled to any compensation, and may be compensated at a
rate of only 15 or 20 per cent of an even larger wage loss. How
important an effect this factor will have on the proportion of ag-
gregate wage loss compensated in a particular recession may de-
pend on which industries are most seriously affected by unemploy-
ment and their customary or depression-induced employment prac-
tices.
The maximum potential duration of unemployment insurance
benefits was originally limited to 16 weeks or less in most states,
largely as a result of what proved to be gross overestimates of the
costs of the program. The maximum duration of benefits has gradu-
ally been increased in all states until it now ranges from 16 to 26
weeks. In only 14 states, however, is the potential duration uniform
for all eligible claimants. In the others potential duration varies
depending on the individual worker's past çmployment and earn-
ings, being as low as 5weeksfor some workers. In 1948 a million
workers exhausted their benefit rights under state unemployment
insurance laws before becoming re-employed; in 1949 the number
jumped to 1.9 million, and in 1950 it was 1.8 million. Both the total
number of persons exhausting benefit rights and the length of time
they remain unemployed thereafter tend to increase as a depression
becomes more severe.
The compensatory effect of unemployment insurance would be
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increased by a number of proposed modifications of the program.
As a result of the 1954 amendments, coverage will be extended be-
ginning in 1955 to about 2.5 million federal employees and about
1.3 million workers in firms employing 4 to 7people.It could easily
(in terms of feasibility) be extended to the 2.1
million employees of firms in industry and commerce that employ
less than 4 and to some 5.0 million government and borderline agri-
cultural workers who will still be excluded. It would be more diffi-
cult but entirely possible to cover all farm and domestic workers as
well.
The original legislative intention was to cover about 50 per cent
of the wage loss by insurance benefits. The present situation results
not so much from an explicit change in what is regarded as the ap-
propriate proportion of wage loss to be compensated as it does from
what might be called the fallacy of absolute numbers. Benefits
today are only one-third of average wages primarily because the
fixed dollar maximums have not been raised proportionately with
rising wage levels. It is probable that many persons have not fully
adjusted their thinking to what today's dollar wage levels should
call for in the way of maximum weekly benefits. It can also be
argued that unemployment insurance would better serve its purpose
if benefits compensated for something like two-thirds rather than
one-half of the wage loss, particularly in the case of workers with
families.
The uniform provision of benefits for 26 weeks to all workers
who remain unemployed that length of time would further greatly
increase the effectiveness of the program. Even if the amount of
wages required to qualify for benefits •were as a result increased
somewhat in some states, thus disqualifying additional marginal
and seasonal workers, the net effect of such uniform duration pro-
visions would be to increase the proportion of wage loss compen-
sated in a period of moderate decline and still more in a deeper
depression.
In summary, a practicable scheme of expanded unemployment
insurance might have the following maximum compensatory result:
Assuming 90 per cent of civilian wages and salaries to be covered,
the effective rate of compensation to be two-thirds of gross weekly
wages (at all levels of earnings), and disqualification provisions to
be less restrictive than they are today, unemployment benefits could
at the maximum compensate for something less than 60 per cent of
the aggregate loss of civilian wages and salaries resulting from
declining economic activity at the beginning of a decline. Whether
209SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
unemployment insurance should be relied upon to provide the
major source of income to unemployed workers throughout a long
depression is debatable. Some would argue that benefit duration
should be extended to 39 or even 52 weeks. Depending on circum-
stances, however, a vigorous public works and public service pro-
gram might be a more desirable alternative for unemployed per-
sons and for society as a whole.
All of the figures presented thus far as to the possible portion of
wage loss that might be compensated have been based on the tacit
assumption that the rate of decline in employment and earnings
would be about the same in the covered as in the noncovered sec-
tors of the economy. Were as much as 90 per cent of civilian wages
and salaries covered, it would make little difference whether or not
this was the case. With more limited coverage, there may be signifi-
cant differences in the extent of wage loss in the covered industries
and the net loss in the economy as ,a whole. If unemployment were
concentrated in covered industries and among lower-paid workers,
even the present limited program could compensate for a larger
portion of aggregate wage loss than the figures cited above suggest.
The opposite situation might also occur. Timing may be important.
The period of time over which the program plays a significant
sustaining role will ordinarily be greater if employment declines
come at different times in different industries or areas than if the
same total decline is concentrated in time and widespread.2
2Theseobservations and the detailed analysis of the 1949—1950 experience
which follows assume that what we are concerned with are (1) the net aggregate
wage loss for the economy as a whole resulting from fairly general declines in
economic activity and (2) the extent to which unemployment benefits replace
this wage loss. That is to say, for purposes of this analysis the (individual) wage
loss—and benefit payments—resulting from seasonal fluctuations in employment
are ruled out. Wage loss is computed on the basis of seasonally adjusted data.
For benefit payments a similar result is achieved for the 1949—1950 period by
taking into account only the amounts above the payments in the same month of
the preceding year (of full employment). This procedure rules out also benefits
paid to compensate for wage losses to the individual resulting from normal job
mobility. Such wage losses are automatically excluded from any aggregate wage
figure.
The wage loss concept used here is a net concept in that any increases in em-
ployment are offset against declines in other sectors. To illustrate some of the
factors operative in the 1949—1950 period, the net aggregate wage loss is com-
puted separately for total civilian wages and salaries, private wages and salaries,
and covered payrolls. Even within the latter, more restricted sector, however,
there will be divergent movements, with some firms or industries expanding even
during a general decline. Such divergent movements would occur in the absence
of unemployment insurance, or of any stabilization policy. The most general
measure of the stabilization potential of unemployment insurance would thus
appear to be that used here—that is, the ratio of the additional or depression-
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN rim 1949—1950DECLINE
An analysis of the operation of unemployment insurance during
1949 and 1950 illustrates some of the factors that determine the
program's effectiveness as a stabilizing device.
The 1949—1950 decline in economic activity was relatively mod-
erate—whatever specific term be used to describe it. Between the
fourth quarter of 1948 and the first quarter of 1949, gross national
product (seasonally adjusted) dropped 2.4 per cent, and it con-
tinued to drop, but by less than 1 per cent, in each of the remain-
ing three quarters of 1949. In the first quarter of 1950 it turned up-
ward, almost reaching the level of the fourth quarter of 1948, and it
increased steadily thereafter.
Personal consumption expenditures (seasonally adjusted) dropped
less than 1 per cent (.6) from the fourth quarter of 1948 to the first
quarter of 1949 and increased slightly thereafter through the middle
of 1950, when the outbreak of war resulted first in a spurt and then
in a relative falling off in consumer buying.
The initial drop in total wages and salaries on a seasonally ad-
justed basis was 2.6 per cent, oniy fractionally higher than the
drop in gross national product. The first upturn in wages and
salaries came in the fourth quarter of 1949, but it was not until
the second quarter of 1950 that this figure reached and surpassed
the fourth-quarter 1948 level.
Unemployment did not reach its peak until February 1950, when
it stood at 4.7 million, or 7.6 per cent of the labor force. In July of
1949 it had reached a peak for that year of 6.4 per cent of the labor
force (see Table 1). Persons receiving unemployment benefits from
the state, railroad, and veterans' programs constituted a larger
proportion of the total number unemployed in March 1949, how-
ever, when they were 84 per cent of the total, than in any subse-
induced benefits to the net (nonseasonal) wage loss of the economy as a whole.
In terms of this ratio the effectiveness of unemployment insurance will be less in
a general and major decline than in a minor depression (assuming the same rela-
tive replacement of individual weekly wage loss), even without taking account
of the factor of the limited duration of benefit This accords with
common sense, and it points up one reason why such an automatic stabilizing
measure is relatively more effective at the outset of a decline and in minor than
in major depressions. On the other hand, in situations where employment declines
are concentrated in particular areas or regions, and what is inwortant is the
maintenance of consumer income in those regions (i.e. where the effect of a
regional decline has not yet spread to the economy as a whole), this method of
measurement and analysis may overstate the effectiveness of unemployment in-
surance as a stabilization measure.
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of Beneficiaries—Per Cent as a Per Centment insur-
Year and NumberState, Railroad andof Civilian of Total mice Benefits
Month UnemployedVeterans' ProgramsLabor ForceUnemployed(Quarterly)
1948
October 1,642 973 2.7% 59.3%
November 1,881 1,047 3.0 57.2
December 1,941 1,351 3.2 69.6 241
1949
January 2,664 1,809 4.4 67.9
February 3,221 2,234 5.8 69.4
March 8,167 2,651 5.2 88.7 871
April 3,016 2,425 5.0 80.4
May 3,289 2,419 5.3 73.5
June 3,778 2,504 6.0 66.3 439
July 4,095 2,464 6.4 60.2
August 3,689 2,346 5.8 63.6
September 3,351 1,972 5.3 58.8 534
October 3,576 1,776 5.7 49.7
November 8,409 1,973 5.4 57.9
December 3,489 2,121 5.6 60.8 591
1950
January 4,480 2,315 7.3 51.7
February 4,684 2,254 7.6 48.1
March 4,123 2,326 6.7 56.4 730
April 3,515 1,701 5.7 48.4
May 3,057 1,672 4.9 54.7
June 3,384 1,466 5.2 43.3 528
July 3,213 1,233 5.0 38.4
August 2,500 1,050 3.9 42.0
September 2,341 852 3.7 36.4 342
October 1,940 692 3.0 35.7
November 2,240 771 3.5 34,4
December 2,229 873 3.6 39.2 253
Source: Monthly Report on the Labor Force, Bureau of the Census; Social Security Adminis-
tration, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; Bureau of Employment Security, Dept. of
Labor.
quent period. The absolute number of weekly beneficiaries under
the three programs combined was also higher in March 1949 than
at any other time during this period. By February 1950, bene-
ficiaries represented only 48 per cent of the total unemployment
figure. The decreasing proportion of persons receiving benefits was
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probably related in part to changes in the previous labor force ex-
perience of the unemployed group. More important, however, was
the increasing number of persons exhausting their benefit rights
before becoming re-employed. Almost three-quarters of a million
persons exhausted their benefit rights under the state unemployment
insurance programs in the first quarter of 1950. The number of
exhaustions in this quarter was almost twice as great as in the first
quarter of 1949, when unemployment insurance was having its
maximum effect.
Per Cent of Wage Loss Compensated. Wage and salary receipts
on a seasonally adjusted annual basis reached a peak in October
1948 which they did not again touch until May 1950. The aggregate
total wage loss over this period, measured from the October 1948
level, was $6.3 billion, and the aggregate civilian wage loss $5.8
billion. Government civilian wages and salaries on a seasonally
adjusted basis increased throughout the period, however, and the
wage loss that occurred was concentrated in the private sector. For
private wages and salaries the total wage loss from October 1948 to
May 1950 was $7.2 billion. Unemployment benefit payments (state,
railroad, and veterans combined) in the same period totaled $3.2
billion. Some of these benefits would have been paid, however, even
had aggregate wages and salaries not decreased. Normal labor
turnover and seasonal unemployment give rise to some unemploy-
ment benefit payments even in periods of full employment. To
measure the extent to which unemployment benefits compensated
for wage losses resulting from the decline in the level of employ-
ment, one has to use some figure representing "additional" bene-
fits.
For state and railroad unemployment benefits, the amount by
which benefits in each month exceeded the payments in the same
month of 1948 (or 1947 if the measurement is on a monthly
rather than a quarterly basis) may be taken as an approximate
measure of such additional or depression-induced benefit pay-
ments. Veterans' unemployment benefit payments, however, had
been high in 1947 and 1948 for reasons other than general employ-
ment conditions and fell off rapidly in the last five months of 1949
because the period of eligibility expired for most veterans on July
25, 1949 (two years after the official end of the war). Since many
veterans would have been receiving state or railroad unemployment
benefits in the absence of the special program for veterans, and
considerable numbers did file claims and receive payments under








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































be disregarded in an analysis of the 1949—1950 experience. As an
expedient it was assumed that half of the veterans' benefits paid in
1949 and 1950 were additional to those that would have been paid
had employment remained at 1948 levels. This is probably an
understatement, but there is no ready basis for a more refined
estimate.
The quarterly wage loss during 1949 and the first quarter of
1950 as measured from the fourth-quarter 1948 level is shown in
Table 2 for civilian wages and salaries, private wages and salaries,
and payrolls covered by state unemployment insurance programs.3
The total wage loss over the entire period is, of course, less when
measured from the fourth quarter of 1948 than from the peak
month of October.
The additional unemployment benefits paid under the state un-
employment insurance laws would appear to have compensated for
about one-fifth of the aggregate loss in covered payrolls during
1949 and the first quarter of 1950. Additional state and railroad
benefits combined represented about 22 per cent of the private
wage and salary loss, and these plus half of the veterans' benefits
paid, about 25 per cent. Because all civilian wages and salaries,
including government, declined less than those in the private
sector alone, the depression-induced state, railroad, and veterans'
benefits together amounted to a little more than 28 per cent of the
aggregate civilian wage loss.4
The seasonal factors applied to payrolls covered by state, unemployment
insurance programs to obtain this measure were developed by Mr. Hyman Kaitz
of the Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor.
Beginning with data for January 1950, the National Income Division of the
Department of Commerce has computed a seasonally adjusted unemployment
benefit payments figure. An alternative method of calculating the increase in
benefits as a result of employment declines—that is, comparison with the level of
seasonally adjusted payments in the base period—is therefore readily available
for periods after 1950. To test the results of the two methods, the increase in
seasonally adjusted benefit payments in the fourth quarter of 1953 and the first
quarter of 1954 above the third quarter of 1953 was computed. The additional
benefit payments in the two quarters were also computed by the method used
for the 1949—1950 analysis—that is, the excess of payments in the given quarter
over payments in the same quarter of the previous year. For state and railroad
benefits combined, the "additional benefit" figures derived by the two methods
were identical for the fourth quarter of 1953; for the first quarter of 1954 the
figure based on the seasonally adjusted data was 92 per cent of the figure based
on the previous year comparison. Using the same method as in the 1949—1950
analysis, state and railroad unemployment benefits compensated for 15.8 per cent.
of the wage loss in private wages and salaries in the fourth quarter of 1953 and
25.6 per cent in the first quarter of 1954, or 22.1 per cent over the two quarters.
Using seasonally adjusted benefit payments data, the extent of wage loss com-
pensated over the two quarters is 20.9 per cent.
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It is possible to derive a rough measure of the effect of the
limited duration provisions of the state unemployment insurance
laws on the total benefits paid. From the fourth quarter of 1948
through the second quarter of 1950, some 8.4 million persons ex-
hausted their benefit rights under the state unemployment insurance
programs before they were re-employed. They had received bene-
fits for an average of about 19.5 weeks. Had all of them received
benefits for a full 26 weeks at the average benefit rate, the aggregate
benefits paid during the period would have been some $467 million
higher than they actually were. Here again, however, account must
be taken of the fact that some workers (particularly those with
limited potential duration) will exhaust benefits even in periods of
high employment. If only exhaustions in excess of those occurring
in the same quarters of 1948 and only through the first quarter
of 1950 are considered, the additional benefit payments resulting
from a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks would have been
about $177 million and state unemployment insurance benefits
would have compensated for 28 instead of 20 per cent of the loss
in covered payrolls.
This entire analysis neglects the fact that under conditions of full
employment, wages and salaries would have been rising throughout
1949 and early 1950 and not merely holding the fourth-quarter
1948 level. It is perhaps sufficient for present purposes to recog-
nize this factor without attempting a quantitative measure.
There might be some interest in a comparison of the extent of
wage loss compensated in different states. Such comparisons would
reflect not only differing economic conditions but also differences
in the benefit provisions of the several states. Time did not permit
any such elaborate analysis in connection with the preparation of
this paper. Nor was there any state in which unemployment was
of such magnitude and duration as to illustrate the operation of
unemployment insurance in a really serious depression. The wage
loss compensated was calculated for one state, Connecticut. This
state was selected because it had a substantial increase in unemploy-
ment from 1948 to 1949, although the absolute level was not un-
usually high, and a relatively large wage loss continuing into the
second quarter of 1950. Its benefit provisions were perhaps a little
above average, primarily because of the provision for dependents'
benefits. The additional benefits paid in 1949 and the first two
quarters of 1950 in the state compensated for 20.6 per cent of the
wage loss in covered payrolls (on a seasonally adjusted basis)
during that period. Had all of the additional persons who exhausted
benefits (those above the number exhausting in the same quarter
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of 1948) received payments for 26 weeks, the proportion of covered
wage loss compensated have been 25.7 per cent.
Benefits Related to Consumption Expenditures. Another measure
of the impact of unemployment benefit payments on the economy
is the relation between aggregate benefits and personal consump-
tion expenditures. In the fourth quarter of 1948, unemployment
benefit payments (state, railroad, and veterans') represented .6
per cent of personal consumption expenditures. This ratio more












In a period when consumption expenditures dropped significantly
(it will be remembered that on a seasonally adjusted basis they were
below the fourth-quarter 1948 level only in the first quarter of 1949),
there could be a much larger increase in the ratio.
Payments and Contributions. In the initial phase of a downturn
in economic activity, the stimulating or, more properly, the sustain-
ing effect of an increase in unemployment benefit payments is pre-
sumably little if at all affected by what happens on the contribution
side of the program. Indeed, throughout even a fairly long de-
pression the economic effects of the benefit payments are probably
quite separate and distinct from the effects of contribution collec-
tions. By and large, benefit payments are spent promptly and in their
entirety. Whatever the ultimate incidence of the employer payroll
tax, it seems unlikely that the continued payment of the tax, at an
established rate, during a period of declining economic activity
would have a significant effect on wages or prices or, therefore, on
consumption expenditures. Under existing laws, however, rates are
not fixed.
Declining covered payrolls would automatically result in lower
aggregate contributions throughout a depression were it not for the
effect of rate changes under the experience-rating provisions of the
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state unemployment insurance laws. Since there is some lime lag in
rate changes, there is likely to be a falling off of contributions in
the early stages of a decline. To what extent contribution rates
will subsequently be increased depends on the severity of the de-
pression. Rate increases are very likely to come just at the wrong
time from the economic point of view—that is, just when employ-
ment and production are beginning to pick up and increased tax
rates may most discourage employers and deter the needed ex-
pansion in economic activity.
The 1949—1950 recession was too brief to show the potential effect
of experience rating. The amounts of contributions collected and
their relation to aggregate benefit payments, by quarter, in 1949
and 1950 are shown in Table 3. Contributions as a per cent of
covered payrolls—which, it will be noted, were higher in 1950 than
in 1949—continued to increase in 1951, amounting to 1.5, 1.6, and
1.5 per cent in the first, second, and third quarters, respectively,
and not dropping to 1.1 per cent until the fourth quarter of that
year.
Because of the operation of the experience-rating provisions,
contribution rates would have increased in 1951 in a number of
states even had employment continued to decline. The precise tim-
ing of rate changes varies from state to state, depending on the
nature of the experience-rating formula used. Thirty-five states
have some requirement of a minimum fund balance before rates
may be reduced below the standard 2.7 per cent, and others have
different rate schedules depending on the status of the reserve fund.
The requirements are too detailed and too varied to lend them-
selves to brief summary. The net effect of the provisions is to re-
quire rate increases—some quite substantial_following any serious
drain on the state's reserve fund. The economic consequences could
be unfortunate. One may question whether the existing provisions
would be permitted to stand in a serious depression.
In addition, the separate financing of unemployment insurance
on a state-by-state basis makes it highly probable that in a depres-
sion of any size one or more state funds would be exhausted. Such
exhaustion would be in states that always have a higher than aver-
age rate of unemployment and that can provide benefits com-
parable to those in other states and accumulate adequate reserves
only by collecting much higher than average contributions from the
employers in the state. Federal loans to states threatened with
bankruptcy of their unemployment insuranìce funds would help


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the fundamental problem of risk sharing across state boundaries.
This problem, of course, involves other issues than those specifically
related to economic stabilization.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECrS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
So many factors contribute to the turn of economic events that
it is difficult to evaluate the significance of a 20 per cent—or in-
deed a 50 per cent—replacement of wage loss in any particular re-
cession or depression. As was said earlier, both the timing and the
localization of employment declines may. make a considerable dif-
ference.
It would seem probable, however, that the availability of unem-
ployment insurance would have a significant effect on the attitudes
and on the expenditures of those who are still at work as well as
of those who are unemployed and drawing benefits. Unemploy-
ment insurance may thus contribute more to sustaining consumer
spending than the ratio of aggregate payments to aggregate wage
loss would suggest.
These secondary effects of unemployment insurance will pre-
sumably be weak and could even become nonexistent when bene-
fits are very low in relation to previous earnings and when the
potential duration of payments is very limited. One may hazard a
guess that an increase in maximum benefit amounts and benefit
duration beyond what they now are in most states would result in
a larger increase in the sustaining force of unemployment insurance
than the actual dollar increases in aggregate benefit payments.
While the compensatory effect of unemployment insurance is
more important at the beginning of a downturn than it would be in
a long depression, the program has a stand-by value that might be
of considerable importance in the event of a serious decline. The
existence of the unemployment insurance machinery would in such
circumstances greatly facilitate both the payment of extended bene-
fits—if this were regarded as desirable—and the orderly referral of
workers to public works and service programs. While one may
hope that the unemployment insurance system will not be called
upon for extensive operations of either type, its availability may
properly be regarded as an institutional safeguard over and above
its automatic stabilizing effect.
2. Old Age and Survivors' Insurance and Related Programs
The importance of the long-term benefits—old age, survivor, and
disability benefits—for economic stability derive primarily from the
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assured base of demand which they provide for increasingly large
segments of the population. In terms of individual benefit amounts
the base may be somewhat meager. Nevertheless, the programs
probably support larger aggregate consumption expenditures than
would be made were these same persons entirely dependent on chil-
dren or other relatives, on their own savings, or on relief. The
assured nature of the benefits is particularly important in a period
of declining employment, not only to the beneficiaries but also to
the children whose earnings might otherwise have to be shared, or
more largely shared, with the beneficiary group.
Furthermore, even these long-term benefit payments do expand or
contract in the aggregate with changing economic conditions. The
tight labor market and increased employment opportunities for the
aged held down the old age and survivors' insurance benefit rolls
during World War II. A serious depression might force many older
persons out of employment and thus substantially increase the num-
ber of beneficiaries and amount of benefit payments beyond what
they would otherwise be.
PRESENT MAGNITUDEOFLONG-TERM BENEFIT PROGRAMS
During 1953 just under $7billionwaspaidin monthly benefits
under old age and survivors' insurance, the railroad retirement sys-
tem, retirement systems for federal, state, and local government em-
ployees, and the veterans' pension program. Benefit payments and
beneficiaries under the several programs were as follows:
Beneficiaries as of Benefits
December 1953 Paid in 1953
(thousands) (millions)
Old age and survivors' insurance 5,981.4 $2,918.8
Railroad retirement 543.1 457.4




There are no good estimates of the number of persons receiving
benefits under workmen's compensation. The amounts paid to per-
sons with long-continued disabilities and to survivors under this
program may be in the neighborhood of a quarter of a billion dollars
a year.
Private pension plans, it may be estimated, paid benefits to some-
thing like 650,000 persons in 1953 at an annual rate of something
under $.4 billion. Most but not all of the persons receiving private
pensions were also receiving benefits under one (or more) of the
public programs.
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The approximately $7.5billiona year being paid under these
long-term benefit programs at the end of 1958 represented 8.3 per
cent of total consumption expenditures in 1953, 2.7 per cent of
personal income, 4.1 per cent of civilian wages and salaries.
POTENTIAL EXPANSION OF OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS'
INSURANCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE
Theold age and survivors' insurance program is still in a period of
fairly rapid expansion benefitwise. Even with no further increase in
the system's coverage (or benefit provisions) beyond that in ef-
fect in 1953, the number of beneficiaries and the aggregate bene-
fit payments would have been substantially larger in the future than
today. The major factors involved in the maturing of the system
are:the increasing proportion of persons reaching the age of
sixty-five who will have had an opportunity to acquire insured status,
the increasing number and proportion of aged persons in the popu-
lation, and the increasing proportion of beneficiaries who will be
receiving the higher benefit amounts based on earnings after
The upward trend in old age and survivors' insurance beneficiaries
and benefit payments (present price levels) under the program in
effect in 1953 would—according to actuarial projections—have con-
tinued throughout this century. The expansion of coverage under
the 1954 amendments will result in a more rapid maturing of the
system but, primarily because of the increasing number of aged
persons in the population, will not change this trend.
For present purposes, however, we are concerned not with the
year 2000 but with the 1950's. The analysis which follows makes
use of estimates of benefit payments in the fiscal years 1956, 1957,
and 1958 on two alternative assumptions as to the economic condi-
tions in those years which were developed in connection with the
preparation of the Fourteenth Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund.6
The 1950 amendments brought in a substantial number of persons under the
"new start" relaxed eligibility provisions, at minimum benefit levels; furthermore,
the increase effectuated by the 1950 and 1952 amendments in the benefits of
those already on the rolls in 1950 were smaller than the benefit formula increases
(including the effect of the new start in the computation of average wages) for
persons with earnings after 1950. The 1954 amendments do not include another
"new start" provision, but they will result in somewhat higher benefits for per-
Sons qualifying on the basis of earnings after 1954 than on the basis of com-
parable earnings in earlier periods.
0am indebted to my colleagues in the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance, particularly Mr. Lawrence Alpern and Miss Roslyn Arnold, for help
in converting these estimates to a calendar year basis and in preparing comparable
estimates for an expanded program.
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The estimates were developed early in 1954 and relate to (1) the
program then in effect and (2) the expanded program proposed
by the Administration for Congressional consideration. The amend-
ments adopted by Congress in August 1954 differ somewhat from
these proposals. Coverage was extended to most but not all of the
groups for whom it had been recommended (the most important
of the groups left out are self-employed doctors, dentists, lawyers,
and members of a few other professions). On the other hand, over-
all benefit liberalizations were slightly greater than those proposed.
It has not been possible in the time available to prepare comparable
estimates based specifically on the 1954 amendments. Such estimates
would differ very little from those shown for an expanded pro-
gram. Certainly the general conclusions to be drawn from the figures
for the purposes of this analysis would be the same. The estimates
based on the act prior to the amendments have been retained for
purposes of comparison. In any use of either set of figures it should
be remembered that the specific amounts derive from a stated set
of economic assumptions and will differ somewhat from estimates
based on other economic assumptions.
The economic underlying the estimates are intended
not as predictions of what is likely to happen in the next three years,
but as illustrations of the way the program would operate under
conditions of relatively high employment or, alternatively, with
moderately heavy unemployment. A mild contraction in 1954 and
early 1955 is assumed to preface both these alternatives. Specifically,
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With continuing moderately high employment, benefit payments
in 1957 under the old age and survivors' insurance program in ef-
fect in 1958 amount to about $4.5 billion (present price levels).
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Should economic activity decline to a point where unemployment
was as high as 9 or 10 per cent of the civilian labor force, a con-
siderable number of older persons would probably be forced out of
jobs and onto the old age and survivors' insurance benefit rolls.
The additional benefit payments under the assumed conditions
might be in the neighborhood of $300 million a year (Table 4).
TABLE 4
Benefits and Beneficiaries under Existing Old Age and Survivors' Insurance

















1955 $3.8 $3.9 5.1
1956 4.2 4.4 5.5





1955 7.0 7.0 8.7
1956 7.5 7.8 9.2
1957 8.0 8.4 9.7
At the present time, almost 1.4 million persons between sixty-
five and seventy-five years of age and with insured status—that is,
persons who could receive benefits if they retired—are still at work.
An indication of the maximum expansion of benefit payments (with-
out changes in legislation) in the event of a major depression can
be obtained by assuming that all of this group retire and they and
their eligible dependents receive benefits. While this limit would
never actually be reached, the figure is nevertheless of some interest.
Because the persons in this group are in general among the higher-
paid workers, their benefits would also be higher than average. As
Table 4 indicates, according to the old age and survivors' insurance
program in effect in 1953, 1957 aggregate benefit payments would
amount to about $5.8 billion if conditions were such as to induce all
persons with insured status to
Noaccount has been taken in these estimates of the fact that some additional
children and younger widows could receive benefits if they stopped working; the
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The total old age and survivors' insurance benefits paid in 1957
as shown in Table 4 represent about 1.3 per cent of aggregate per-
sonal income under the high-employment assumptions used and 1.7
per cent under the low-.
EFFECT OF EXPANDED COVERAGE AND BENEFIT PROVISIONS
The old age and survivors' insurance program in effect in 1958
covered almost four-fifths of the civilian labor force. The 1954
amendments extended coverage to almost all paid employment ef-
fective as of January 1, 1955. The major groups still not covered
are: railroad workers (who have a separate system partially inte-
grated with old age and survivors' insurance); federal government
workers covered by the Civil Service Retirement system and mili-
tary retirement systems (for whom old age and survivors' insurance
coverage also has now been recommended); self-employed doctors,
dentists, lawyers, and members of a few other professions; and ir-
regularly employed agricultural workers. The immediate effect of
coverage extension alone is to increase contributions more than
aggregate benefit payments, since it takes a little time for individuals
in newly covered jobs to acquire insured status. There will, how-
ever, be an increase in the number of beneficiaries on the rolls in
1957 as compared with the number who would have qualified un-
der the law in effect earlier. And in the long run, of course, the ef-
fectiveness of the program will be substantially increased.
In spite of the increases in benefits as a result of the 1950 and
• 1952 amendments of the Social Security Act, the benefits payable
to workers retiring in 1953 and early 1954 were lower, when ad-
justed for price changes, than the dollar amount of benefits that
would by this time have been payable under the 1939 act to work-
ers with the same average earnings. The deterioration in the value
of the benefits is most striking in terms of the proportion of wage
loss compensated. Under the 1989 act the taxable wage base, which
sets a limit on both the amount of the individual earnings on which
contributions are payable and the amount credited for benefit pur-
poses, was $3,000. At the time, 97 per cent of the workers covered
by the program (and 95 per cent of those in covered employment
in each of the four quarters of the year) had total covered earnings
of less than $3,000 a year. Benefits, in other words, were related to
the total earnings (in covered employment) of all but the very
amounts involved would be small and would be partially counterbalanced by the
smallernumber of valid claims for survivor benefits at iow than at highemploy-
ment levels.
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highest-paid group. To achieve a similar result in early 1954, the
taxable wage base would have had to be $7,500 rather than the
$3,600. set by the then-existing law or the $4,200 adopted under
the 1954 amendments.
Because the 1950 amendments changed the benefit formula, the
benefits paid in 1953 and early 1954 covered a larger proportion of
the worker's previous average earnings, and those payable under the
1954 amendments will also cover a larger proportion, than the above
comparison alone would suggest. The benefit formula has from the
beginning provided compensation at a higher rate for the lower-paid
workers. Under the 1939 act the maximum old age benefit (worker
alone) would have been about 23 per cent of his previous average
earnings for a worker with the maximum creditable earnings when
the program reached maturity (the 1939 act provided a small incre-
ment in the benefit for each year of coverage and contributions;
this was eliminated in 1950 and there is now no such differential).
Under the law in effect in 1953, a worker with maximum earnings
credits ($3,600 a year) could receive a benefit equal to 28 per cent
of his earnings. But 44 per cent of all four-quarter workers (about
40 per cent of all workers) now earn considerably more than $3,600.
For the $7,500-a-year worker, the proportion of previous earnings
compensated was 13.6 per cent. Where a beneficiary has a wife who
is aged sixty-five or over, the family situation and the total wage loss
compensated are somewhat better, since the wife will receive a
benefit half that of her husband's.
The 1954 amendments both increased the taxable wage base to
$4,200 and modified the benefit formula. The new maximum indi-
vidual old age benefit of $108.50 a month represents 31 per cent of
the previous earnings for a worker with the maximum wage credits
($4,200) and 17 per cent for a person with earnings of $7,500 a
year.8
Had the original Administration proposals been adopted to go
8Onequalification must be noted with regard to all of the figures on percent-
age of earnings loss compensated. The figures given are strictly the percentage
of computed average monthly wage. Since the average monthly wage is computed
by dividing total wage credits by total elapsed time since 1951 (or 1937 for most
of those now on the rolls), it is likely to be lower than actual average earnings
when the worker was engaged in covered employment or than such earnings in
the five or ten years prior to retirement. This would be particularly true in periods
when earnings levels were rising. The 1954 amendments improve the correspond-
ence between actual and computed earnings for all except the newly covered
group (and for those in this group who are regularly employed after 1954),, by
dropping out of the computation up to five years in which the individual's earn-
ings were lowest (or non-existent).
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into effect by January 1, 1955,aggregatebenefit payments in 1955,
1956, and 1957, under the same employment conditions as were
assumed above, would amount to:
AGGREGATEBENEFITPAYMENTS
(billions of dollars)
Relatively HighLower EmploymentIf All Eligible
Employment Levels Aged Retired
1955 4.5 4.5 5.9
1956 5.0 5.2 6.5
1957 5.6 5,9 7.2
Aswas indicated earlier, the 1954 amendments enacted by Con-
gress liberalized benefits a little more but extended coverage to
somewhat fewer persons than the original Administration proposals.
The retirement test, under the amendments, does not apply begin-
fling with age seventy-two rather than age seventy-five, and the test
itself is somewhat easier to meet. Aggregate benefit payments in 1955,
1956, and 1957 under the act as now amended and under the as-
sumed economic conditions would be slightly but not significantly
larger than the estimated amounts shown above.
Other proposals for the modification of old age and survivors'
insurance which have been advanced by various groups would re-
suit in larger increases in benefit payments than those effectuated
by the 1954 amendments. It has not been possible, nor would it be
particularly useful, to attempt similar estimates for all the proposals
that might be reviewed in an analysis of the program aspects of old
age and survivors' insurance.
Some mention should perhaps be made, however, of the magni-
tude of the benefit payments that would result if the old age and
survivors' insurance program were expanded to provide monthly
long-term disability benefits, similar to the benefits now provided
under the raikoad retirement program and most retirement sys-
tems for government employees. Such benefits are generally more
sensitive than old age retirement benefits to fluctuations in eco-
nomic conditions and employment levels. Depending on the precise
specifications, long-term disability benefit; payments under old age
and survivors' insurance might, on the average, amount to as little
as .01 per cent of taxable payrolls (as estimated for the proposals
of the 1949 Advisory Council on Social Security to the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance) or up to 1 per cent with more liberal provisions,
after the program had been in effect long enough so that most dis-
abled persons had had time to acquire insured status before becom-
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ing disabled. In terms of present payroll levels and the coverage
and taxable earnings base provided in the 1954 amendments, this
would mean payments in an average year of up. to about $2 bil-
lion. At the outset of any such program expansion, the aggregate
disability benefits paid would be considerably smaller, since many
persons already disabled would presumably not be able to qualify
for benefits.
CONTRIBUTIONS ANDBENEFITPAYMENTS
The contribution income of the old age and survivors' insurance
fund is at present larger than the benefit outlays, at least at high
levels of employment (Table 5).
TABLE 5
Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Contributions and Benefit Payments under
Alternative Assumptions as to Employment Conditions and Provisions of




CONTRIBUTIONS BENEFIT PAYMENTS LESS (—.)oii
COLLECTED a MORE(+) THAN CONTRIBUTIONS
Relatively Lower Relatively Lower
High Employment High Employment
Employment Levels Employment Levels
1958





5.7 5.5 —1.9 —1.6
6.1 5.5 —1.9 —1.1




Expanded Coverage, Somewhat Liberalized Benefits
6.3 6.0 —1.8 —1.5
7.2 6.5 —2.2 —1.3
7.6 6.4 —2.0 —.5
a Thecontribution rate in 1953 was 1.5 per cent each for employers and em-
ployees and 2.25 per cent on earnings from self-employment; in 1955, 1956, and
1957 the rate in the 1953 law and under the 1954 amendments is 2 per cent each
for employers and employees and 3 per cent on earnings from self-employment.
Under the program in effect in 1953, total contributions in 1957
would have been about $1.9 billion more than aggregate benefit
payments if economic conditions were good, but only about $.5
billion more under conditions in which 10 per cent of the labor force
were unemployed.
Under an expanded program with coverage and benefit provi-
sions such as those proposed by the Administration or embodied in
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the 1954 amendments, the net excess of total contributions would
be somewhat smaller in 1955 and larger in 1956 than under the
law in effect in 1953, because the benefit increases would take effect
in 1955 while the increased contribution income from expansion of
coverage to self-employed groups would not show up in collections
until 1956. With unemployment of about 10 per cent of the civilian
labor force, the total benefit payments under the Administration's
program in 1957 would amount to about $5.9 billion, and contribu-
tions collected to about $6.4 billion, resulting in the same net dif-
ference as under the program in effect in 1953. Because of the more
limited coverage provisions actually adopted in 1954, contributions
under the assumed economic condition would be slightly less than
shown in Table 5.
OTHER BETIIIEMENT PROGRAMS, 1955—1957
Neither the railroad retirement program nor the government
employee retirement programs as a group are growing at the same
rate as old age and survivors' insurance. Many of the larger govern-
ment retirement systems were established thirty or more years
ago and have thus had time to reach relative maturity. The railroad
system began by taking over the pensioners on the rolls of the
private railroad pension plans and crediting past railroad employ-
ment and thus covered a large proportion of the current aged rail-
road workers immediately.
By 1957, with present statutory provisions and present price
levels, aggregate benefit payments under these programs might be
in the neighborhood of $1.6 billion if employment conditions were
relatively good, or $1.7 billion if something like 10 per cent of the
civilian labor force were unemployed. The Railroad Retirement
Board estimates that at the end of 1951 there were more than
150,000 persons working in railroad employment who could have
retired and drawn benefits. Had all eligible persons retired, bene-
fit payments under the railroad act in 1953 might have been about
$.2 billion higher than they actually were. There are probably rela-
tively fewer persons in government employment who could retire
on a full age annuity if they so wished than persons eligible for old
age and survivors' insurance but still at work. On the other hand,
most retirement systems for government employees as well as the
railroad retirement system pay monthly disability benefits. Because
persons with disabling conditions have difficulty holding jobs when
employment conditions are bad, aggregate disability benefit pay-
ments are likely to increase as unemployment becomes more serious.
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If old age and survivors' insurance coverage were extended to
all employments and the railroad and government systems made
supplementary, payments under these special programs would
eventually be less than they would be under present law. Since
present annuitants would not be affected, however, any such change
would make very little difference in the amounts paid under the
special systems in 1957, and for present purposes this kind of pro-
gram change can be disregarded.
Veterans' benefits will probably be considerably larger in 1957
than they were in 1953, with no changes in existing veterans' legisla-
tion and assuming no wartime service between now and then. The
largest increases to be anticipated are in the non-service-connected
pensions, as more and more World War I veterans reach the age of
sixty-five. (On June 30, 1953, the average age of the 3.3 million
World War I veterans was fifty-nine.) By 1957, total compensation
and pension benefits for veterans wiii probably be somewhat over
$3 billion if employment is at a high level and still larger if em-
ployment declines.9 Since the non-service-connected pensions are
subject to an income test (at present $1,400 a year for a single
veteran, a widow without children, or for the child of a veteran;
$2,700 for a veteran who is married or has minor children or for a
widow with a child), the aggregate benefits paid are likely to in-
crease rather substantially if there is a serious drop in employment.
The number of persons receiving private pensions is also increas-
ing. By and large, however, private pensions are paid only to per-
Sons who have remained with a single employer for a considerable
period of time, and in many plans, particularly the large collectively
bargained plans, these persons must be in that employer's pay at the
time of retirement. As a result, many of the persons who at one
time or another are covered by private plans will never qualify for
pensions. Many plans, furthermore, do not give credits for service
prior to the time the plan was initiated and will therefore pay no
benefits or very small benefits to workers now approaching retire-
ment age. A very rough estimate might place the aggregate amount
of private pensions in 1957 at between $.5 and .6 billion.
The rate of fund accumulation is much greater under private pen-
sion plans than under old age and survivors' insurance. At present,
employer contributions to pension plans are about $2.8 billion a
See statement of Phillip S. Hughes, Bureau of the Budget, on "Veterans
Benefits in Relation to Old-Age and Survivors Insurance," in Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, House
of Representatives, 83d Cong. 1st sess., November 12 and 18, 1953, Part 2, 1953.
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year and employee contributions about $.5 billion. Thus at present,
aggregate private pension payments (under $.4 billion) are still less
even than employee contributions and, of course, very much less
than total contributions. Total private pension fund reserves have
been estimated to be about $17 billion (the old age and survivors'
insurance reserve at the end of 1953 was $18.7 billion).
Total contributions under the railroad retirement program in
1953 amounted to $.6 billion. Benefit payments in that year were
$150 million less than total contributions. The most recent estimates
of contributions under all government employee retirement pro-
grams are for 1952. In that year, when aggregate benefit payments
were $1.0 billion, employee contributions to federal, state, and local
retirement programs amounted to $.9 billion, and earmarked gov-
ernmentemployer)contributions to these retirement systems were
$.9 billion; in addition, the general revenues were drawn on to pro-
vide the $.35 billion of benefits paid by the federal noncontributory
retirement systems. Veterans' benefitsare,of course, financed
directly from general revenues.
3. Public Assistance
It is perhaps debatable whether the public assistance programs
should be included among the built-in stabilizers, since the size of
the payments is not specified in law and the amounts appropriated
are subject to budget and debt limitations just when there is most
need for their expansion. Nevertheless, the institutional weight of
public assistance is such that it would seem to deserve some con-
sideration in a discussion of this kind.
At the end of 1953 there were about 5.4 million persons receiv-
ing public assistance—2.6 million aged persons, 1.5 million children
and .5 million parents or adult relatives of such children, .1 mil-
lion blind and .2 million permanently and totally disabled, and
about .6 million persons receiving general assistance. The total
amount of public assistance paid in 1953 was $2.5 billion. The
number of persons sixty-five and over in need of assistance should
decrease fairly steadily as old age and survivors' insurance expands
over the next decade—assuming that old age and survivors' in-
surance benefit levels keep up with any increases in prices. It is
more difficult to predict what will happen in the other programs.
The size of the public assistance rolls is influenced by economic
conditions. Not only can some older persons, some disabled per-
sons, some widows and other women in families in which the nor-
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mal breadwinner is absent or incapacitated, and some children
get jobs when conditions are good who would not otherwise be
able to do so. In addition, contributions from relatives are more
frequent when earnings are high, and less assistance is needed to
maintain the same level of living for the recipients. Indeed, one
way in which families adjust to wage loss when economic conditions
are bad is to shift part of the support of parents or other relatives
to public assistance.
The compensatory effect of public assistance is sharply limited,
however, by the unavailability or inadequacy of general assistance
in many states. In a number of states general assistance is not given
to persons regarded as employable. This limitation might be swept
away under the pressures of a severe depression. It is also some-
what modified by the existence of general assistance programs in
practically all large cities where industrial unemployment tends
to concentrate. These programs tend in most instances to be ad-
justed to urgent local needs. But in the continued absence of federal
grants-in-aid, it is unlikely that the necessary changes would come
quickly enough to have any significant effect in a moderate reces-
sion. In the 1949—1950 recession, general assistance payments in-
creased from about $16 million a month in October 1948 to a high
of $33 million in March of 1950 and then dropped slowly until by
the end of 1950 they were again near the 1948 levels. Over the en-
tire two-year period, aggregate general assistance payments were
only $180 million larger than they would have been had each
month's payment been the same as the amount paid in the same
month of 1948.
Federal grants-in-aid now provide about 55 per cent of the old
age assistance payments, 57 per cent of the aid to dependent chil-
dren, and 49 and 51 per cent respectively of the payments under
the programs of aid to the blind and aid to the permanently and
totally disabled. On a nationwide basis, 'but with great variation
from state to state, about 39 per cent of the old age assistance pay-
ments and more than a third of the payments under the other feder-
ally aided programs are financed from state funds, with only 6 per
cent coming from local funds in the case of old age assistance and
11 per cent or less in the case of the other three. For general as-
sistance, however, almost half the funds come from local revenues,
with local funds carrying the entire burden in fifteen states and 80
or 90 per cent in several more. The heavy reliance on local financing
of general assistance seriously limits the potential importance of
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that program in a depression. It is partly in recognition of this prob-
lem that a number of states have taken over all or a large share of
the financing of general assistance. One state, New York, increases
the proportion of state funds available for general assistance when
unemployment is heavy.
While the existing federal grants for public assistance are not re-
lated directly either to the relative economic capacity of the states
or to the level of employment, they do nevertheless provide a
broader basis of financial support than would be available in many
states from state and local funds alone. The flexibility of the feder-
ally aided assistance programs would be greater if—as has fre-
quently been proposed—the extent of federal matching were di-
rectly related to the states' fiscal and economic, capacity, with pro-
portionately more federalfunds going to the states with lower than
average per capita incomes.
It is probable that in any serious depression the federal govern-
ment would be forced to provide financial aid for general assistance
and on condition that such assistance be available to employable
as well as unemployable persons. Such emergency extension of aid
would be much more easily accomplished today than was possible
in the early 1930's, when very few states had state welfare depart-
ments and the whole machinery for federal grants and for the dis-
tribution of assistance had to be improvised. The administrative
mechanism is now available; the fiscal arrangements that would
make public assistance a more reliable built-in stabilizer are still
to be adopted.
4. Conclusion
An established social security system is a stabilizing factor in
the economy because of the assured income provided to large
segments of the nonworking population, the compensatory expan-
sion of aggregate benefits when employment falls off, the probably
wider effect on consumer spending of 'the knowledge that unem-
ployment benefits or old age benefits will be available, and the in-
stitutional mechanism the system provides for any desired emer-
gency measures. The quantitative importance of these several fac-
tors will depend not only on the scope of the program actually in
existence at any time, but also on the circumstances and timing of
econOmic change. Social security programs are particularly vulner-
able to the erosion of inflation. The extent of their contribution in
a period of economic decline may be greatly affected by the de-
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gree to which benefits have been kept in line with rising prices
and with rising wage levels. This is a problem which has received
too little attention.
The quantitative analysis of the operation of unemployment in-
surance in the 1949—1950 recession and of potential old age and
survivors' insurance and related benefit payments in 1955—1957 pre-
sented in this paper is intended to do no more than illustrate the
general magnitude of the direct economic effects of our existing
social security programs. It may finally be useful—again only for
illustrative purposes—to summarize the magnitudes involved by
relating them to the wage loss that is implied in the second alterna-
tive set of economic assumptions used above in projecting old age
and survivors' insurance benefit payments and contributions. The
pattern of economic change illustrated is one of a decline from
only moderately high levels of employment in 1954 and early
1955 to fairly substantial unemployment in 1956 and 1957.
The loss in total earnings in employments covered by old age and
survivors' insurance over the three-year period when measured from
1954 levels is about $20 billion. The difference between total cov-
ered earnings under the relatively high employment of alternative
I and those under the lower levels of alternative II over the three-
year period is $93 billion.10
Against these earnings-loss figures one may set certain program
data. If the additional depression-induced unemployment benefit
payments compensated for 20 per cent of the wage loss measured
from 1954 levels, such additional unemployment insurance bene-
fits during the three years would aggregate $3.1 billion. This is per-
haps too high a proportion to assume unless one also assumes some
liberalization of the duration provisions of existing state laws. On
the other hand, both wage loss and hence the computed additional
unemployment benefits would be higher if measured on a monthly
or quarterly basis. If legislative changes were extensive enough and
rapid enough to result in compensation of as much as one-third of
wage loss in covered industries in 1956 and 1957, the aggregate ad-
ditional unemployment insurance benefits over the three-year pe-
riod could be closer to $5.2 billion.
One dilemma that arises in short-run projections of payments
under any social security program is how much weight to give to
existing program provisions and how much to proposed or possible
10Grossnational product is asumed to be $380 billion in 1955 and $420 bil-
lion in 1957 under alternative I; $357 billion in 1955 and $846 billion in 1957
under alternative II.
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modifications. On the one hand, it should be recognized that the
built-in stabilizing effects of the program are only those which are
already in existence and that changes in legislation take time. How-
ever, the stimulus of an emergency situation may result in much
faster action than would otherwise occur.
Total old age and survivors' insurance benefit payments during
the three years with the assumed lower levels of employment would
amount to $13 billion under the program in effect in 1958 and to
about $16 billion under an expanded and liberalized program such
as that brought into effect by the 1.954amendments.While old age
and survivors' insurance contributions would exceed benefit pay-
ments over the three years by perhaps $3 billion, the excess would
be at least $2.5billionsmaller than would have occurred at rela-
lively high levels of employment.
Payments during the three years under the railroad and federal,
state, and local government employee retirement systems might be
close to $5 billion, private pensions about $1.5 billion, and veterans'
pensions about $9 biffion. Total long-term benefits plus additional
unemployment insurance benefits might thus aggregate close to
$35billionunder existing programs or $37 billion were the unem-
ployrnent insurance program further expanded and liberalized,
It may be noted that the two alternative estimates on which these
figures are based do not carry through to an upturn and renewed
high levels of employment. The story is left incomplete. It is perhaps
sufficient to suggest, however, the great actual and the greater p0-
tential importance of social security programs not only to the mil-
lions of individuals and families for whom they are the main source
of income but to the functioning of the economy.
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